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A Presuppositional Critique of Constructivism 
Whenever setting forth a “theory of everything” or a meta-narrative, an author typically 
stands in the original or accepted paradigm to communicate his or her thoughts, while seeking to 
destroy that one and replace it with a new “correct” one. Constructivist theorists do this when 
they stand on the shoulders of traditional theorists with regard to logical argumentation, the 
notion of the value of persuasion, and purposiveness (writing a book to inform others, make 
money, and arguably believing themselves correct); but, in so doing, they essentially knock out 
their own foundations from beneath themselves. Their own theory does not give them impetus to 
say anything about the theory.  
The argument set forth herein is a presuppositional one. Specifically, the author argues 
that it is one’s presuppositions that characterize - and even constrain - acceptance of one meta-
narrative or another. Subsequently, it is argued that understanding the epistemological 
alternatives helps one determine which system seems most true to reality, and which is the most 
comprehensive and cohesive. Then, constructivism as both a philosophical and educational 
approach are considered and critiqued from a Biblical revelation-based, objectivist approach.  
Everyone accepts some form of meta-narrative (even those who rail against meta-
narratives have one of their own). It is vital to think on the level of presuppositions (or axioms) 
because these always play an important, yet often hidden, role in discourse. Schlossberg (1990) 
clearly illustrates the importance of understanding assumptions and the role they play when he 
argues that assumptions bypass the critical engagement of underlying ideas to address the overt 
concept expressed in an argument. Once an assumption is allowed to persist, one’s mind tends to 
accept it for the duration of the discussion. He writes: “A false assumption can be combined with 
an unassailable argument, which then proves the truth of what is false” (1990, p. 211).  
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Within the field of education, the question arises, whether children’s “ways of knowing” 
should be considered formative for the classroom and curriculum or whether classroom or 
curriculum should form the student’s “ways of knowing.” Essentially the question is reduced to 
asking whether history, academic fields, and culture should be instructive of the student (an 
objectivist approach), or whether the student should fit these ideas into his or her thinking to 
transform information (a constructivist approach). The answer is determined by one’s 
presuppositions not only about the nature of truth, but also by the current understanding of how 
learning occurs. The first part is philosophical, the second is functional. 
A priori human mental endowments must exist for learning to take place (Clark, 1968, p. 
57). Empirical discoveries can never be universally true laws as experience can never give 
universal judgments; mankind is constrained by its temporal nature, only knowing the past 
(Clark, 1968). Therefore, the author assumes a priori endowmentsi and will discuss this further 
shortly. Given this a priori assumption, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis - on which much of 
constructivism rests - that “language precedes thought” - is incomplete.ii It is incomplete in that it 
fails to illuminate how anything, including language, is learnable at all. The only possibility is 
that at least some a priori mental endowment exists. Most notably, the author would argue, is 
that mankind is endowed with memory, classification, recognition/attribution faculties, and logic 
(inductive and deductive reasoning capabilities). Language is merely the vehicle for transmission 
and organization of thought – the thought emanates from sensory data after analysis by these a 
priori endowments that exist in human beings reflecting the image of God.iii   
Essentially, what people believe about ontology (being or beings), epistemology 
(knowing), hermeneutics (interpretive methods), and axiology (valuations), as well as the manner 
in which thinkers give primacy to these ideas, dictates the kinds of answers one can arrive at 
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regarding all of life. Each decision on the basic questions provides an axiom and leads to other 
axioms based on those foundational beliefs. Foundational beliefs are just that: beliefs. They are 
non-provable. While one cannot act as if presuppositions are provable, it is possible to make 
arguments in their favor and demonstrate their coherence and validity, and even to demonstrate 
that they are valuable in interpreting the world. Are presuppositions useful in making sense of 
the world of reason and experience, the world that is known? As Gordon Haddon Clark puts it, “. 
. . can we assert creation without implying something about zoology? No, truth is not thus 
disjointed. It is systematic. And by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged” (emphasis 
added) (1968, p. 60). 
Ontological Options 
 Ontology deals with the questions “Who am I?” and “How do I exist?” (Martin, 2006). 
The answers to these questions could be wildly divergent, and historically this can be seen in 
various faith systems, both religious and non-religious. However, whether one examines a 
Babylonian creation epic or is reading a modern attempt to explain big bang cosmology, there 
are still the same two options: a super-naturalistic or a naturalistic explanation (Martin, 2006, p. 
19). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in depth the mechanisms by which 
this binary comes to be, it is important to note that one’s choice in this regard dramatically 
affects choices in the other arenas. Thus, people accept or differ in ideas about the type of special 
or natural creation we live in, and the type of creator or process that brought about this world. 
T.S. Eliot gives the options quite clearly, “Man is man because he can recognize supernatural 
realities, not because he can invent them. Either everything in man can be traced as a 
development from below or something must come from above… you must be either a naturalist 
or a supernaturalist.” (1932, p. 397). 
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 Typical options regarding questions of ontology begin with the concepts of Ontological 
Realism (that a world exists independent of human cognition, thought, or speech processes) and 
Ontological Idealism (that “the world” is a construct of human cognition and thought). These 
choices are based upon personal decisions with regard to the broader category: natural or 
supernatural. The supernatural option leads the author to assume a Creator. The Biblical concept 
of the Creator God is most compelling on numerous levels but these levels are not discussed 
here. Thus, answers to the subsequent ontological issues are developed on that basis. Ontological 
Realism seems most appropriate because when a person’s noetic activity ceases, the world 
continues because a “proposition exists because God thinks or conceives it” (Plantinga, 1982, p. 
70). Therefore, in some sense the author does accept a form of constructivism of Reality, in that 
God constructs it by His thought. God creates a proposition by thinking/speaking it and as such 
God also believes the Truth of His own proposition. Plantinga argues that the most sensible anti-
realists are Biblical theists (1982). To clarify: One’s choice regarding a naturalistic or super-
naturalistic ontology leads to choices regarding a real or ideal ontology of the world (creation).  
Epistemic Options 
 The concept of “how people know anything at all” and on “what basis people accept that 
knowledge” is not as straightforward as the ontological options. To clarify the concept, John 
Peifer asks “Do we, in knowing, by means of what is thought, attain to things, to realities which 
enjoy an independence in physical existence outside of thought, or do we by knowing attain only 
to what is in thought?” Peifer continues, “Does thinking terminate in things or in thought?” 
(1962, p. 11). Plato attempted to answer this question in Republic, Book VII with The Allegory of 
the Cave. Plato’s argument is that people are like chained prisoners who can only view in one 
direction, toward the wall of the cave they are within. There burns a fire behind them 
4
Christian Perspectives in Education, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cpe/vol3/iss1/7
Critiquing Constructivism 5 
Christian Perspectives in Education, Vol. 3, No. 1, Fall 2009 
 
illuminating objects and their own shadows. This is all they know and all they can know. They 
do not realize that there is a real thing, a so-called Platonic “form” that is what is really real, 
because they only perceive the shadows (Plato).iv Much of C.S. Lewis’ writings serve to 
illustrate his concept of Plato’s forms in Christian fashion – from The Chronicles of Narnia 
series to other more expressive works such as Mere Christianity and God in the Dock. Following 
from this, Lewis’ essay “Meditation in a Toolshed: ‘Looking Along’ vs. ‘Looking At’” begins to 
advance Lewis’ concept of the shadowlands. 
 Plato’s answer to the question is that human thinking ends in representations of things, 
and that “if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error” they would actually see and 
know what is really Real (Plato). Of course, Plato’s point is that people need to be ruled by 
philosopher-kings (like himself) so they can be released in a wise manner from their slavery. 
Plato answered his epistemological question based on his ontology. This pattern of reasoning 
(deal with ontology first, then epistemology derived therefrom, followed by hermeneutics, etc.) 
basically held true until the Enlightenment. It is at this point we see a shift in primacy from being 
to knowing, or rather, from ontology as primary, to epistemology as primary. Knowing came to 
precede being, as Descartes placed the rational self as the foundation of knowledge with “Cogito 
ergo sum” (“I think therefore I am”) (Sire, 2004, p. 216). Thinking and rationalism (not mere 
rationality) become the hallmarks of the Modern world. In science this worked wonders, but in 
philosophy the result was dismal.  
 For instance, the philosopher Hume raises the question “How is it that we know 
anything?” and Kant attempts to answer him. The effect of Cartesian rationalism is “exalting the 
knowing self to the position of ‘creating’ reality” (Sire, 2004, p. 218). Nietzsche furthers the 
Cartesian argument and questions the certainty of the existing self. “What if it is the thinking that 
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creates or causes the I rather than the I that causes the thinking?” (Sire, 2004, p. 218). So, as Sire 
points out, there is another shift in primacy: “from knowing to meaning.” Knowledge can no 
longer be a basis for anything and thus Truth vanishes (2004, p. 217). “In the absence of truth 
there is only power” (D. Beck, personal communication, October 9, 2007), and justice vanishes 
with truth.  
It is power that postmodernists typically focus on. Truth and truths are “power” and “the 
authority to determine what counts as true is also the power to determine who counts as 
important” (White, 2006, p. 55). This assumption plays an important role in educational 
philosophy. Essentially, then, there is a shift in what is seen as the philosophical first question. 
The Pre-moderns structured philosophy in the following manner: ontology  epistemology  
hermeneutics; the Modernist in emphasizing knowledge changed the order to epistemology  
ontology  hermeneutics; the Postmodern era now emphasizes meaning which reorients the 
questions again to hermeneutics  epistemology  ontology.  
 The position that Plato ends with is what might be called naïve realism or common-sense 
realism. The notion is that meaning is found in a “’vertical’ relation between terms and their 
referents,” or rather, that words correspond directly with Reality (Sayer, 2000, p. 35). Naugle 
argues that there are three options with regard to epistemology: naïve realism, creative anti-
realism, and critical realism. The following premises describing the positions are from Naugle’s 
book Worldview: The History of a Concept (2002, pp. 322-24). 
Naïve Realism 
1) an objective, independent reality exists; 
2) the character of this reality is fixed and independent of any observer; 
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3) human knowers have trustworthy cognitive capacities by which to apprehend this 
fixed reality unencumbered by personal prejudices and traditions;  
4) truth and knowledge about the world are discovered and certain, not invented and 
relative. 
Creative Anti-Realism 
1) while an external world may, and probably does exist, its objective character 
remains forever obscure; 
2) human knowers lack epistemic access to apprehend the world as it is in itself; 
3) what poses as reality is linguistically constructed, an idealistic product of the 
human mind; 
4) consequently, truth and knowledge about the world are not discovered and 
certain, but invented and relative. 
Critical Realism 
1) an objective, independent reality exists; 
2) the character of this reality is fixed and independent of any observer; 
3) human knowers have trustworthy cognitive capacities by which to apprehend this 
fixed reality, but the influences of personal prejudices and worldview traditions 
conditions or relativizes the knowing process; 
4) truth and knowledge about the world, therefore, are partially discovered and 
certain, and partially invented and relative.  
The Naïve Realist would answer the question “Can we know truth it itself” (ding-an-sich) 
in the affirmative. The Creative Anti-Realist would also answer in the affirmative, in that truth is 
created within the subject so, in that sense, people can truly know what they create (truth is 
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subject-laden). But the Critical Realist would answer both yes and no: “yes” in that people have 
epistemic access to the Truth, which is Real, but “no” in that there are subjective elements to 
reality (they are perspectival due to the finiteness of human beings), and because the sin nature 
constrains the ability to know the Truth entirely as sinners are biased against the Truth. Again, 
the importance of revelation is illustrated.  
Van Til argues that those who do not believe in revelation “can and do argue logically, 
but do so on borrowed capital” (1978, p. 69).  The theistic critical realist would likely parallel 
each proposition mentioned above with the following concepts: 1) God thinks/spoke this Reality, 
so it is Real; 2) God is unchanging; 3) mankind is created in the image of God (i.e., he has the 
capacity for logical reasoning), but the fall of man affects his faculties; 4) Scripture assumes 
Truth but allows for the subjective nature of some truth in reality (for example, the Apostle Paul 
becomes “all things to all men” (I Cor. 9:22)). This is also seen in 1 Cor. 13:12, where Paul 
states “For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I 
will know fully just as I also have been fully known.” 
Truth? What is Truth? 
Aristotle, in defining truth, stated: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it 
is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true” (Stanford). So 
to Aristotle, truth is a subjective acknowledgment of what actually is. This is known as the 
correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theorist would argue that absolute or 
objective Truth is available and the human faculties can know it. This is also essentially the 
Platonic or naïve realist conceptualization of truth. 
 It is largely on the correspondence theory of truth that constructivism levels its most 
devastating attack. Putnam mentions that there is “no ‘God’s-eye view’ from which we might 
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compare our utterances to the world” (2008, p. 103). He argues that it is impossible to know who 
is right by standing inside a competing paradigm; people can only make more or less compelling 
argument in favor of one perspective or another. Arguments are more or less compelling based 
on our presuppositions regarding the nature of man, knowledge, and reality, but they terminate in 
unproven assumptions (axioms) about reality that collectively maintain a semblance of logic and 
define our conceptual schemes.  
 Clark is correct that secular philosophy has failed in that it cannot establish the law of 
non-contradiction (1968, p. 64). According to current trends in constructivist philosophy, objects 
can be both true and false in the same given situation. This premise undoes almost 2500 years of 
philosophy and denies what most experience in everyday life: namely, that pink is not blue and 
that 1+1≠11.   
 The typical understanding of truth is justified, true belief. Thus, it would be written 
logically accordingly: 
Any thinker T, knows p, if and only if 
1. T believes p; 
2. T is justified in believing p; 
3. p is true. 
The major issue is that postmodern thought is destroying objectivity about facts, justification, 
and rational explanation, and in so doing it destroys the possibility of any knowledge or truth at 
all (Boghossian, 2006, pp. 15-24). There is only relativism about everything, including logic. As 
Boghossian, (2006, p. 40) points out; the social constructivist picture of reality is as follows:  
1. Since we have socially constructed p, therefore p. 
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2. Since it is possible that another community should have constructed the fact 
that not-p, then possibly not-p; 
3. So, it is possible that both p and not-p. 
He continues,  
How could it be the case both that the first Americans originated in Asia 
and that they did not originate there but originated instead in a 
subterranean world of spirits? How could it be the case both that the world 
is flat (the fact constructed by pre-Aristotelian Greeks) and that it is round 
(the fact constructed by us) (2006, p. 40)? 
The idea that truth is socially constructed essentially does away with any possibility of 
having facts at all. Truth is impossible, because constructivism (specifically fact-constructivism) 
stands contrary to the law of non-contradiction. The law of non-contradiction cannot be 
established if modern secular philosophy has destroyed the possibility of it. Constructivism 
thusly destroys the foundations that it argues from, namely that it is a logical, empirically 
demonstrable and testable theory. Since it cannot do so, there remains only irrationalism.  
A More Solid Foundation 
Turning back to Clark’s presuppositional argument of axiomatic revelation, John 1:1 
states: “In the Beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” 
The term translated “Word” is the Koine Greek Logos, from which the word ‘logic’ derives. 
Christ is the Logos: that is, “the definition, the theory, the argument, the principle of law, the 
sentence, the wisdom … so in the beginning was, the Logic” (Clark, 1968, p. 67). Logic 
therefore is the description of how God thinks. Demonstrating this concept, Stephen Charnock 
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(as quoted in Clark, p. 66) argues, “God knows himself because his knowledge with his will is 
the cause of all other things.” 
 The law of non-contradiction merely explains the manner in which reality, as created by 
God’s thinking, works. The thoughts in the Bible are the thoughts of God (1 Cor. 2:16 – “We 
have the mind of Christ”; Phil. 2:5 – “Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus.”). 
Therefore, men have an a priori rational endowment because God’s nature is rationality. Human 
beings are created in His image (imago dei) and are “the expression on a created level of the 
internal coherence of God’s nature” (Frame, 2004). Similarly, “the science of logic seeks to 
discover the principles (such as the law of non-contradiction) for correct inferences and correct 
judgments of consistency” (Frame, 2004). 
Historical Approach 
 A rather common breakdown within the philosophy of history is viewed from the 
perspectives of transitions in thought from pre-modernity to modernity and then to post-
modernity. Pre-moderns characteristically accepted the authority of the church. Hence there is an 
acceptance of the status quo with regard to the available answers to the basic questions. 
Regarding ontology: God created and mankind exists within that creation and can know it. The 
authority of the church and the truth of the Scriptures were acknowledged because “what was 
needed for both knowledge and virtue could be found in the resources of tradition” (White, 2006, 
p. 25). Education was rare and typically focused on a study of authoritative texts, not critical 
studies or experimentation (White, 2006, p. 26). So Premoderns ultimately placed their faith in 
authority. Moderns lost their faith in authority and placed it in human reason around the time of 
the enlightenment. Finally, the Postmoderns kept the Modernist distrust of authority but lost their 
faith in reason and have found nothing to replace their faith (White, 2006, p. 41).  
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Knowledge Shifts: Pre-modernity  Modernity  Post-modernity 
The Cartesian foundational proposition Cogito ergo sum sets up the Modern era; an era in 
which most philosophers believed certain truths were actually self-evident (Boghossian, 2006, p. 
116). Descartes and Locke were both convinced of the reasoning power of the human mind to 
solve the deepest questions plaguing humanity (White, 2006, p. 31). Prior to the Cartesian 
revolution, most knowledge in Western society was derived from church teaching and the Bible 
more indirectly was the basis for what was true. For Pre-moderns, the idea “was for the Biblical 
text to shape the worldview of the reader” (White, 2006, p. 118). Nevertheless, Descartes’ desire 
to find complete intellectual certitude was fatal to Modernism, to what Kant called the “Cartesian 
revolution.” Too much faith was placed in the ability of the human mind (Sire, 1997). Sire (1997, 
p. 236) points out that God claims to be “I AM WHO I AM”: the self-existing, self-referential 
one (cf. Exodus 3:14). The rationalist approach says that there is reality and people can know it 
through their own inherent rationality. This has come under intense scrutiny (by both pre-
moderns and post-moderns) due to the failure of modernity to create the better world it has 
promised since the Enlightenment. Progress has never occurred in the utopian manner of the 
modern context. The constructivist approach responds and asks how one even knows there is 
Reality outside of his or her subjectively created reality (i.e.. creative anti-realism). All that can 
be said is that the only reality that is even knowable is that which we create. The critical realist 
admits fallibility in knowledge (as Kuhn so aptly demonstrates in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions) but adheres to the existence of an objective reality (contra Kuhn who was an anti-
foundationalist). Reality is knowable, but from a fallible, finite perspective. There is a blend of 
the rational and objective with the subjective; that honors both the Logos (who is Christ) and the 
12
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subjective created being in his or her context. It is a reorientation from an overemphasis on 
objectivity (modernity) and an overemphasis on subjectivity (post-modernity). 
Problems with Constructivism in Particular 
 Schlossberg criticizes the social constructivist position in that it “always has the 
environment precede the idea, even when it cannot provide evidence for that order” (1990, p. 
154). Constructivists Berger and Luckmann admit that they take their root proposition from 
Marx: specifically Marx’s premise “that man’s consciousness is determined by his social being” 
(1967, pp. 5-6). The issue with this sort of formulation is that there is another assumption: that 
history is the same as nature (another derivative of Marx’s materialism). Reinhold Niebuhr 
criticizes this in The Irony of American History, calling it “naïve belief” (2008, p. 80). The idea 
that methods used in understanding nature can be used in studying human action and interaction 
is naïve according to Niebuhr (i.e., it is a category error). But this should be no surprise as most 
social scientists begin with presuppositions of the natural (rather than supernatural) and hence 
believe that “mind is a product of material origin or that human behavior is completely 
contingent on prior experiences” (Schlossberg, 1990, p. 153). Following from this, “the habitat 
accounts for the opinions of the thinker and explains why his ideas are different from those of 
another person who lives in a different habitat” (Schlossberg, 1990, p. 153). Schlossberg 
continues: 
The all-inclusiveness of the system [social constructivism] makes it 
invulnerable to refutation, regardless of the evidence adduced . . . All arguments 
are turned back as further evidence that the speaker is bound by the determining 
influence . . .which Mannheim admits is a “means for side-stepping the 
discussion.” . . . Such imperviousness to refutation, far from being a sign of 
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strength, is further evidence that these disciplines are not the sciences they claim 
to be (p. 156). 
Karl Popper levies strong criticism of constructivism by arguing, according to the theory, 
that the entire theory might simply be the expression of the class interests of those who advocate 
this theory (1971, p. 243). This is actually quite amusing as it might be the only critique that 
actually cannot be subsumed by the theory. 
 Philosophical constructivism as a system is internally consistent for the most part, in that 
it is strong enough to redefine everything according to the theory itself. However, like any other 
worldview, it has certain basic propositions that are un-provable, that must be accepted simply 
on faith. One of the main problems with this worldview is that it terminates in the relativization 
of Truth to perspectival truths. There can be no True facts in this system, only pragmatic facts. 
This is self-refuting in that scientific data, argumentation, and logic are used to demonstrate and 
“sell” a worldview that denies the Truth of those types of arguments. Secondly, it is not 
ultimately a livable and viable system: the hard sciences reject it outright as no facts can be 
generated in the system; thus no one can fly to the moon if we socially construct physics. In the 
end an inability to determine what is True must inevitably result in a breakdown of culture as 
opposed to a protection of all from the power of others over them, as postmoderns typically seek 
(cf. White, 2006, p. 55-57). Knowledge is no longer seen as power; for the postmodern, truth is 
power; so anyone claiming to have Truth is immediately castigated as attempting to control and 
“colonize the minds” of others. While it is important to be concerned with how Truth is used, 
throwing out the concept of throwing out Truth altogether does not eliminate oppression. The 
removal of Truth merely causes all truths to have equal legitimacy, so that anything that the 
14
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powerful happen to dislike can be deemed oppressive, and still be called true. Legal philosopher 
Robert P. George argues that relativism  
. . . is the worst possible way to defend the ideals of freedom and democracy 
because moral relativism, if it does anything, undermines those ideals. If all things 
are relative and matters of subjective opinion, then the belief in the dignity of the 
individual, the belief that people ought not to be enslaved, the idea that people 
ought to have their freedom respected… all of those would be undermined. There 
would be no reason for believing those; the contrary views of Stalin, or Hitler 
would have just as great a claim to governing, to ruling, as our own claims (Acton 
Media, 2008). 
The effects of constructivist relativism are as devastating within the educational field as within 
the realm of political science and the law. The concept of the equal legitimacy of truths 
decimates traditional understandings and purposes of education. Walter Truett Anderson (1997) 
argues that post-modernism “rejects the notion that the purpose of education is primarily to train 
a child’s cognitive capacity for reason in order to produce an adult capable of functioning 
independently in the world.” Anderson continues, “That view of education is replaced with the 
view that education is to take an essentially indeterminate being and give it social identity” (p. 
114). 
Constructivism in Education 
As any comprehensive theory, constructivism has implications for other areas of life. In 
education, postmodern thinking has detrimental effects as truth and reality no longer exist other 
than in our perceptions and beliefs of that truth or reality. When philosophical constructivism 
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extends into the realm of education (yielding the educational theory called constructivism), the 
philosophy sets forth specific practices.  
Windschitl (1999) defines constructivism as the “belief that learners actively create, 
interpret, and reorganize knowledge in individual ways” (p. 151). Similarly, Siegel argues, 
“knowledge is acquired through interactions with the environment.” Travis and Lord (2004) 
provide an example of how constructivism works in a non-major biology class and lab, stating 
“definitions of terms were not simply given; instead, student teams had to create their own 
definitions and then explain them to the class” (p. 16). Such ideas have direct roots in 
philosophical postmodernism - in the social constructivist vein. Piaget and Vygotsky took 
different stances on whether physical development precedes learning, or social learning precedes 
development (Galloway, 2001). Vygotsky’s is a more entrenched constructivist position, 
focusing notably on language and meaningfulness in development, while Piaget focuses instead 
on assimilation and accommodation of new ideas and does not seat them linguistically, instead 
seeing children as born with schemas and continually acquiring these schemas from which they 
comprehend the world. It could be said that Vygotsky discussed the interactive nature of truths 
and Piaget focused on factual representations of truths. If modernism primarily appeals to 
rationality, then postmodernity primarily appeals to meaning. If an object or concept in one’s 
mind does not actually reflect some reality outside that mental concept, then interpretation and 
meaning become absolutely essential. If two people have no common external reference point, 
then all communication is, in the final analysis, pointless.  
Nevertheless, as people do exist in society, and they have a pragmatic need to act as if 
things were really true, given that people do engage in social activity. To that end, the facilitation 
of social existence, or education, must be reconceived since “all knowledge is invented or 
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‘constructed’ in the minds of learners. It can’t be any other way, postmodernists say, because the 
ideas teachers teach and students learn do not correspond to any objective [external] reality” 
(DeLashmutt & Braund, 1996, p. 99).  
According to the constructivist view of truth, the purpose of education is either to 
“educate the individual child in a manner which supports the child’s interests and needs” or to 
bring about “social transformation and the reconstruction of society aligned with democratic 
ideals” (Vadeboncoeur, 1997, p. 15). The first is a less radical goal, but both of these goals are 
derived from an anti-realist view of truth. As mentioned previously, “knowledge, ideas, and 
language are created by people not because they are ‘true,’ but rather because they are useful” 
(DeLashmutt & Braund, 1996, p. 99). Abdal-Haqq argues that to “accomplish the goals of social 
transformation and reconstruction, the context of education must be deconstructed, and the 
cultural assumptions, power relationships, and historical influences that undergird it must be 
exposed, critiqued, and, when necessary, altered” (1998, para. 8). Constructivism takes a very 
specific socially and politically oriented shape in the classroom to bring about changes in the 
societal status quo.  
For the constructivist, since learning only happens in the context of social interaction, and 
since teachers do not have privileged relationship to truth, constructivists advocate a radical 
departure from the modernist idea of education. Bruffee (quoted in Petraglia, 1998, p. 95) states 
that “a social constructionist position in any discipline assumes that entities we normally call 
reality, knowledge, thought, facts, texts, selves, and so on are constructs generated by 
communities of like-minded peers.” Thus,  
. . . knowledge arises through consensus rather than through correspondence with 
objective truth or in an individual’s autonomous construction of that reality. For 
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educators… social constructionism seems a logical and complementary extension of 
constructivist learning theory especially as embodied in sociohistoricist and second-wave 
cognitive schools of thought (emphasis added) (Petraglia, pp. 95-95).  
If there is no knowable truth outside of oneself, the individual thinker becomes the only 
thing of importance since it may not be True that others really exist. Functionally, though the 
individual must yield to social definitions, the social truth is that others do exist. Ultimately, any 
form of constructivism that is based in anti-realist epistemological theory cannot but begin to fall 
into solipsism. Martinez-Delgado (2002) argues that constructivism ends in solipsism or else 
falls back toward realism, often paralleling “the axioms of the realist model; at the same time 
constructivism aspires to conserve the principal methods of scientific analysis (with their 
representative mental operations) and their results…” (p. 847). In any case, the constructivist can 
never remain grounded in constructivism consistently. Quoting Balmes (1846), Martinez-
Delgado in essence ridicules Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) “reality of everyday life” as overly 
philosophical and anti-real: 
  The same philosophers that have taken skepticism so far, have concurred 
on the necessity of… relegating doubt to the world of speculation. A philosopher 
will argue over everything, as much as he wants; but in ceasing the argument, he 
stops being a philosopher and continues being a human like the rest and enjoys 
certainty like the others (Martinez-Delgado, 2002, p. 850). 
In discussing pedagogy, Martinez-Delgado (2002) says that constructivist teaching techniques 
are another example of the fall back towards realism. The idea that “a planned connection 
between activities and the knowledge developed as a result entails the acceptance of a 
psychological realism…” (p. 850). In the end an “extreme objective realism is superimposed on 
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psychological realism [and] the dependence of the knowledge upon the activities performed is 
uniform for every student…” (Martinez-Delgado, 2002, p. 851). Constructivism “adopts the 
positions of a realism so absolute that it approximates to the attitudes of a mechanistic 
materialism” (Martinez-Delgado, 2002, p. 851). 
The chart below, recreated from DeLashmutt and Braund (1997, p. 97) demonstrates the 
Modern to Postmodern shift in perspective in four important arenas that pertain to education on a 
“below the surface” level: knowledge, culture, values, and human nature.   
 Modernist Theory Postmodern Theory 
Knowledge Educators should be authoritative 
transmitters of unbiased knowledge. 
Educators are biased facilitators and co-
"constructors" of knowledge. 
 
Culture Culture is both an object of study and 
a barrier to learning. Students from 
diverse cultures must be trained in a 
shared language before teachers can 
transmit knowledge to them. 
 
The modernist goal of unifying society results in 
domination and exploitation, because unity is 
always based on dominant culture. All cultures are 
not only of equal value, but also constitute equally 
important realities. Minority students must be 
empowered to fight against Eurocentric 
enculturation. 
 
Values Traditional modernists believe that 
educators are legitimate authorities on 
values, and therefore they should train 
students in universal values.  Liberal 
modernists argue that education 
should be "values neutral." Teachers 
help students with "values 
clarification,” deciding what values 
each individual student will hold. 
Values can and should be separated 
from facts. The most important values 
are rationality, freedom, and progress. 
 
Education should help students construct diverse 
and personally useful values in the context of other 
cultures. Values are considered useful for a given 
culture, not true or right in any universal sense. 
Since teachers cannot avoid teaching their own 
values, it is okay for teachers to openly promote 
their values and social agendas in the classroom as 
long as these are not fundamentalist or totalistic.  
Important values to teach include diversity, 
tolerance, freedom, creativity, emotional 
expressiveness, and use of intuition. 
 
Human 
Nature 
Modernists generally believe in a 
stable, inherent self that can be 
objectively known. Since humans are 
thought to have a stable essential 
nature, IQ tests and other similar 
"objective tests" can be used to 
discover students' innate intelligence. 
Students have no "true self" or innate essence. 
Rather, selves are social constructs. Postmodern 
educators believe self-esteem is a precondition for 
learning. They view education as a type of 
therapy. Education helps individuals appreciate 
their identities rather than discover them. 
Individuals and society progress when people are 
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By giving students mastery over 
subject matter, teachers enhance 
students' self-esteem. Education helps 
individuals discover their identities. 
Individuals and society progress by 
learning and applying objective 
knowledge. 
 
empowered to attain their own chosen goals. 
 
  
At issue in the postmodern view of education is the central theme that knowledge has no 
objective basis on which individual perceptions and ideas can be weighed. Essentially this 
negates education from the viewpoint of the pre-modern (traditionalist) or the modernist 
educator. This is why constructivist methodology in education appears so odd. From this 
perspective, all student ideas are as valuable as the instructor’s, so that the teacher is refashioned 
as a facilitator of learning. Teachers are situational designers and assistants. Alesandrini states 
that teachers “in a constructivist classroom are called to function as facilitators who coach 
learners as they blaze their own paths toward personally meaningful goals” (2002, para. 11). 
Leaving nine-year-olds to move toward “personally meaningful goals” might not be a wise idea. 
As Alesandrini and Larson explain: “Collaboration facilitates each member’s ability to see 
problems from multiple perspectives or different points of view. Group members constantly 
‘negotiate meaning’ . . . ” (2008, p. 118). This “negotiation of meaning” illustrates Richard 
Rorty’s comment on truth being whatever “our peers will let us get away with saying” (1981, p. 
176). 
 While students come together to learn collaboratively, DeVries and Zan (1996) argue that 
education which is “preoccupied with giving back correct information destroys curiosity and 
leads to intellectual dullness and knowledge full of egocentric misunderstanding” (p. 118). They 
also clarify the constructivist perspective on discipline:  
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Emphasis on obedience fosters self-doubt and other qualities needed for submission. . . . 
Authoritarian regulation of academic lessons reinforces moral as well as intellectual 
heteronomy . . . reflected in a passive orientation to the ideas of others, an unquestioning 
and uncritical attitude, and low motivation to reason (DeVries and Zan, 1996, p. 118). 
But the constructivist perspective undermines any ability to enforce discipline, so the teacher will 
need to depart the constructivist paradigm to tell a student that “school isn’t the time for texting 
friends on their cell phone.” Telling a student to go to the principal’s office for misbehavior is 
simply a power play and a display of, from a constructivist point of view, teacher arrogance. In 
other words, teachers adhere to constructivism for a lesson, but not in the rest of life.  
Common trends and teaching techniques that abound in constructivist literature include a 
focus on the learner rather than the learning (Windschitl, 1999); the concept that all viewpoints 
are valid, so there are no “right” answers (DeLashmutt & Braund, 1996); the affirmation that all 
cultures and lifestyles must be affirmed as valid choices if individually made (tolerance) 
(Baglieri & Knopf, 2004); a general distaste for rote memorization and fact transmission 
(Windschitl, 1999; Travis & Lord, 2004); and attention to personal experience, for in sharing 
experiences, people negotiate meaningful symbols which are shared (Fosnot, 2005; Blumer, 
1969; Mead, 1934). Grading by a teacher is seen as an illegitimate assertion of power over the 
student, and it is thought that students should be involved in self-assessment through developing 
their own evaluative criteria (Alesandrini and Larson, 2002). 
Windschitl (1999) demonstrates his postmodern motivations when describing the 
problems associated with the modernist teacher-centered or fact-based instruction: 
Individual desks face the front of the room, where the teacher occupies a privileged space 
of knowing authority; students work individually on identical, skill-based assignments to 
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ensure uniformity of learning. Value statements are embedded everywhere in this 
environment (p. 152). 
Truth cannot be known, so it becomes illegitimate to assert knowledge, as knowledge can only 
come from a desire for power (a “power play”). In the teaching context, though, it would seem to 
destroy the traditional purposes of education. Windschitl (1999), DeLashmutt & Braund (1996), 
and Abdel-Haqq (1998) make that point well.  
 One final issue regarding Constructivism as an educational philosophy is that there are 
criteria that federal and state governments have imposed as to what should be taught and to what 
level of learning. Windschitl (1999) writes that perhaps the most “politically sensitive issue 
confronting teachers is that the diversity of understandings emerging from constructivist 
instruction does not always seem compatible with state and local standards (p. 155) (emphasis 
added). Given the presuppositions of constructivist philosophy, there is no Truth, therefore there 
are only truths; hence it is disingenuous for a government to set forth which truth(s) should be 
taught. But since it is required by law (and constructivist teachers would get in trouble for not 
teaching the material), it is easy to forget the philosophical underpinnings of constructivist 
educational philosophy. Most will simply act as Balmes (1846) says people do. A constructivist 
teacher will “stop being a philosopher and continues being a human like the rest and enjoys 
certainty like the others” (in Martinez-Delgado, 2002). The constructivist acts in life as if things 
are certain, which is why constructivists continue to survive. If they acted as if laws of motion 
were simply social constructions, they would easily pull out in front of trucks without fear. 
However, constructivists do not live out their philosophy consistently because they implicitly 
recognize that some things are True: in this case, that pulling out in front of a tractor-trailer is 
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imprudent since the truck might not be able stop and might strike the constructivist’s vehicle, 
causing property damage, injury, or death.  
Constructivist Curricula 
 Many constructivist curricula have been adopted, notably in New York City, where the 
program “Everyday Math” has been adopted. But it was dropped in Texas for “leaving public 
school students unprepared for college,” according to one New York Sun article (Green, 2007). 
Columnist and author Michelle Malkin (2007) argues that this curriculum doesn’t teach 
memorization of multiplication tables. Instead the fifth grade “Everyday Math” book asks 
questions such as  
A. If math were a color, it would be___, because___. 
B. If it were a food, it would be___, because___. 
C. If it were weather, it would be___, because___.  
 
This math curriculum, termed “fuzzy math” by some critics, might be partly to blame for 
recent lower than expected scores on math and science in the 2006 Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA). According to the report, American students fell below the 
international average, scoring below students from16 of 30 developed nations that participated in 
the examination (PISA, 2006). Data from the 2003 exam yielded the same results. Given the 
postmodern turn in society, and its embrace by the educational arena in particular, this is of little 
surprise. The trend will likely continue unless math and science curricula are reexamined in light 
of their presuppositions. As meteorologist M.J. McDermott explains in her video Math 
Education: An Inconvenient Truth, large sections of the Everyday Math textbooks concentrate on 
such subjects as how to use a calculator,  and how to plan a U.S. or World Tour, and leave 
insufficient time for learning how to “do” math. McDermott quotes the textbook: 
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The authors of Everyday Mathematics do not believe it is worth students’ 
time and effort to fully develop highly efficient paper and pencil algorithms for all 
possible whole number, fraction, and decimal division problems. Mastery of the 
intricacies of such algorithms is a huge endeavor; one that experience tells us is 
doomed to failure for many students. It is simply counter-productive to invest 
many hours of precious class time on such algorithms. The mathematical payoff is 
not worth the cost, particularly because quotients can be found quickly and 
accurately with a calculator. (Everyday Mathematics, § 1.2.4) (emphasis added). 
The mathematical payoff is not worth the cost of class time because the class time is invested 
toward socialization activities rather than a mastery of mathematics. Since the authors’ 
experience tells them that many students are doomed to fail, they seem to wish to make all 
students less competent in math. The goal of this math curriculum is for the student to have a 
meaningful experience (as evidenced by the emphasis on group activities) rather than for him to 
achieve success.  
Math is simply one of many areas that are being undermined by constructivist 
educational theory. In the end, the goals of constructivist learning seek to “help teacher education 
students deconstruct their own prior knowledge and attitudes, comprehend how these 
understandings evolved, explore the effects they have on actions and behavior, and consider 
alternate conceptions and premises that may be more serviceable in teaching” (Abdal-Haqq, 
1998). Again quoting Abdal-Haqq: 
To derive culturally relevant and socially just pedagogy and practice from 
constructivist epistemologies, Martin (1994) and Vadeboncoeur (1997) urge 
teacher educators to deconstruct and scrutinize cultural assumptions that underlie 
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various interpretations of constructivism to expose how social beliefs have 
influenced the development of theory and practices. Without such scrutiny, 
societal inequities and historical forms of oppression may be perpetuated in 
supposedly constructivist classrooms, and the very constraints on individual 
development constructivists seek to remove or ameliorate will be reinforced 
(1998, para. 15) (emphasis added). 
Ultimately, it appears that the main goal in constructivist theory is to not teach anything, 
but to simply allow the children to figure out what they want to be “true for them” through a 
guiding or facilitation process. The assumption is that children understand critical thinking (and 
hence what is best for themselves). The preceding quotation demonstrates that the ultimate 
concern is with “social inequities and oppression”—which may or may not be objectively the 
case. But even if oppression can be demonstrated, for the constructivist to remain consistent, 
they must admit that the oppression may be merely perspectival and not actual. If no truth is 
taught, then teachers cannot be guilty of oppression. Social stereotypes would dissolve once 
people realize that society has simply constructed things as true. However, it would seem that 
reflecting a commonly shared epistemic Reality is far more sociable than each person 
individually creating a reality that that no one else can relate to or understand. Eliminating 
oppression is a Biblical concept, but Christian theology does not provide a basis for every belief 
or state of affairs to be considered oppressive. Absent Truth, and anything can be considered 
oppressive. Ultimately, this comes down to a cultural and philosophical battle but one that has 
spiritual roots: 
For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and 
divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been 
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made, so that they are without excuse. For even though they knew God, they did 
not honor Him as God or give thanks; but they became futile in their speculations, 
and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing to be wise, they became fools . . . 
(Romans 1:20-22, NASB) (emphasis added). 
 A Christian perspective on education cannot embrace fact-constructivism and remain 
Christian. If there is no such thing as Truth, “education serves the purpose of guiding students to 
create truth that is in accord with their individual belief systems. Truth becomes a social 
construct of a given culture; ideas must be formulated using the language of that culture . . . since 
all truth is created by individuals, then all truth must be equally valid” (Schultz, 2005, pp. 27-
28). Thus, the basis of protecting human rights and even traditional liberties erodes. If all truths 
are equal, then the ideas of any genocidal tyrant are just as valid as Christ’s. The Bible is clear, 
that knowledge of God—hence Reality, Truth, and definition (Logos)—ought to be transmitted 
to the next generation both within and without a given culture as charged in the Great 
Commission (Matt. 28). People should be told what the truth is. Then, as they grow in maturity, 
they may discover how it relates to their lives personally. Deuteronomy 6:7-9 states, 
You shall love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your 
soul and with all your might. These words, which I am commanding you 
today, shall be on your heart. You shall teach them diligently to your sons 
and shall talk of them when you sit in your house and when you walk by 
the way and when you lie down and when you rise up. You shall bind 
them as a sign on your hand and they shall be as frontals on your forehead. 
You shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates 
(NASB). 
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And Jesus came up and spoke to them, saying, "All authority has 
been given to Me in heaven and on earth. Go therefore and make disciples 
of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son 
and the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I commanded you..." 
(Matt. 28:18-20, NASB). 
Within these distinct yet related commands, there is an implicit assumption that God 
created people so that they can know truth and so that truth can be transmitted, but the 
knowledge and the transmission is best accomplished in the context of relationship. The 
constructivist would interpret the command of the Great Commission and the Gospel itself as a 
“power play”: an assertion of the lack of equality in people’s truths, which at its core, it is. Truth 
and meaningfulness are not always aligned in people’s lives, but they can and should be. This is 
in part, what, what is meant by the “renewing of the mind” in Romans 12:2. 
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Appendix 
To illustrate that constructivism is more of a faith system than a scientific enterprise, the following 
summation of the presuppositions is offered (from Schlossberg, 1990; Naugle, 2002; Plantinga, 
1982; White, 2006; Sire, 2004; Boghossian, 2007):   
• Constructivism assumes the truth of its root proposition “that man’s consciousness is 
determined by his social being” (à la Karl Marx). 
• Constructivism assumes a value-free social science (Schlossberg, 1990, p. 155). 
• Proponents of constructivism unjustifiably exempt social constructivism from its own 
relativization (Schlossberg, 1990, p.155). 
• Proponents of constructivism use logic and persuasion but disprove the truth of logic; the 
theorist falls prey to his theory (c.f. White, 2006, p. 82). 
• Inherently, the act of telling others about social constructivism is meaningless, if one 
assumes the truth of the system. 
• Proponents of constructivism attempt to include worldviews in their analysis (Berger 
specifically), but fail to see their own perspective as a worldview, which removes 
constructivism from the criticism it levies on others (Naugle, 2002, p. 233). 
• Berger’s constructivism conflates a difference in representation with a difference in the 
thing represented (i.e., he mistakes “different worlds” for “differences in belief about the 
world”). 
• Constructivism is “hugely empowering. If we can be said to know up front that any item of 
knowledge only has that status because it gets a nod from our contingent social values, then 
any claim to knowledge can be dispatched if we happen not to share the values on which it 
allegedly depends” (Boghossian, 2007, p. 130). For the postmodern thinker “grammar is 
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power: whoever controls the rules and ordinary usages of a language controls what can be 
thought” (White, 2006, p. 99). 
• Constructivism asserts that the “powerful cannot criticize the oppressed, because the central 
epistemological categories are inexorably tied to particular perspectives. It also follows that 
the oppressed cannot criticize the powerful… unless we allow a “double standard: allow a 
questionable idea to be criticized if it is held by those in a position of power – Christian 
creationism, for example – but not if it is held by those whom the powerful oppress – Zuni 
creationism, for example” (White, 2006, p. 99). 
• Constructivism is valuable in that it demonstrates the fact that society molds us in many 
ways, but if it molded us in all ways, and we are simply the “product of the blind forces of 
nature and society, then so is our view that we are only the product of the blind forces of 
nature and society. A radical sociology of knowledge is also self-refuting” (Sire, 2004, pp. 
236-237). 
• The idea that we have no access to reality and that we can only have stories is self-
referentially incoherent. It is an illogical axiom, or “put crudely, this idea cannot account for 
itself, for it tells us something that, on its own account, we cannot know” (Sire, 2004, pp. 
236-237). Likewise, if it is true that all discourse is a power play and should be questioned 
(a la Foucault) then should not that proposition also be questioned? The proposition only 
makes sense if that one sentence is excluded from being a power play (Sire, 2004, p. 236). 
• The answer to the question “Is Constructivism True?” can never be answered in the 
affirmative. From within the system, the constructivist accepts relativity, so it can be true 
(but only in a pragmatic sense; that it is instructive perhaps), but not True. From outside the 
system, no one would accept it as true without being subsumed by the system.  
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i
 For Durkheim, this meant Cultural Collective Representations & Mental Collective Representations; for Mead this 
was social interaction or language and meaning (Bergesen, 2004, p. 2). Both accept a materialist presupposition; the 
idea that we are composed solely of matter, and the organic “brain secretes thought like the liver produces bile” 
(Pierre Cabanis). The author rejects this presupposition in favor of the notion that personal identity is situated in 
one’s soul or mind is and animates the body. 
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ii
 The second and third propositions are that “Language is not a given” and “Language is culturally determined.” 
The three propositions create a both a “linguistic determinism” and a “linguistic relativity”. The author would argue 
that language did not arise or evolve out of a social need, but God endowed Adam with this for him to name the 
animals, but more importantly so that Adam could talk with God, and vice versa. Even after the Tower of Babel 
incident, language (whichever one spoke) corresponded to a meaning in the mind that was communicated. Language 
does change as technology and culture change, but nonetheless it still communicates meaning. 
iii
 Van Til asserted that both Christians and non-Christians employ logic, but non-Christians employ it to 
suppress the truth (1967, p. 103; Romans 1:18). Both use the same laws of logic, but the non-Christian has “no basis 
for believing that the laws of logic apply to reality” (Frame, 2004). Some forms of the way people think are socially 
constructed, to be sure, but to argue that only this surface realityiii exists, the reality of everyday life in Berger and 
Luckmann’s terms, and to ignore the full range of worldview options is naïve to the presuppositionalist. 
 
iv
 “The Matrix Trilogy” movies put this concept in vivid detail, albeit with extensive artistic license. 
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